Should IRBs Monitor Research More Strictly? by Nicholas A. Christakis
IRBs were established to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects of research.' This duty has usually been fulfilled by reviewing the research protocol and the informed consent document to ensure an acceptable level of risk and a complete process of informed consent. Ensuring subject well-being, however, may at times require a contact with the investigator and the project beyond reviewing paperwork. Protection of the subjects of research may occasionally require the IRB to monitor the adherence to its decisions and assess the adequacy of the entire informed consent process.2
The federal regulations regarding IRBs anticipated the necessity of monitoring activity. They provided for the IRB to "have authority to observe or have a third party observe the consent process and the research."3 Moreover, the IRB is supposed to "suspend or terminate approval of research that is not being conducted in accordance with the IRB's requirements or that has been associated with unexpected serious harm to subjects"4 and inform the Secretary of HHS. Obviously, to make a determination of this kind requires some form of ongoing surveillance or, at a minimum, some ongoing personal contact with the research and not just a perfunctory annual review.
Yet few IRBs maintain such an ongoing contact. In a study conducted for the U.S. government and published in 1978, 639 of IRBs surveyed never designated representatives to observe the manner in which a research project is being conducted. Only 479 reported that their institution had a policy by which investigators could report harm to subjects arising from the research.5 More recent anecdotal evidence is consonant with this study.6 For example, in one report, only 2-3 percent of IRB members reported direct participation by their IRBs in the consent process or review of adherence to committee decisions. Arthur Caplan, a medical ethicist, also advocated monitoring. He recognized that "the primary problem with the present system of IRB review...is that it devotes too much time to the production of paper promises and almost no time to the enforcement, investigation, or general assurance that the promises will be kept."" Basically, Caplan would prefer to have IRBs review fewer protocols (through a method of random sampling), and spend more time on enforcement.
On the other side of the debate were those who feared that such monitoring of IRB decisions could rapidly result in the transformation of the IRB from a review and advisory body into a police force. 
Monitoring in Practice
How, then, have IRBs dealt with these conflicting expectations regarding their monitoring duties? The literature reveals a few occasions when an IRB has established a review or follow-up procedure. IRB members seem to have resolved their anxiety about how much monitoring they should do by occasionally adopting a more active role in two types of protocols: (1) research that is especially risky; and (2) research that is likely to come under scrutiny by outsiders-such as the press. However, even in these types of protocols, monitoring is conducted only sporadically.
Some have specifically advocated the riskiness of the protocol as a standard for IRB monitoring. Levine maintains that "the need for monitoring systems is likely to arise from considerations of some aspects of risks and benefits... . 17 Presumably, higher risk would warrant greater IRB surveillance. For example, in a case involving cardiac catheterization, one IRB "required its own oversight process....It was felt that the IRB would be able to assure itself continuously of the ongoing safety of the project and appropriateness of the consent process."18 And, indeed, the federal regulations recognized the importance of more supervision when the stakes are higher, as in the case of pregnant subjects.19
With respect to protocols subject to outsider scrutiny, more active IRB surveillance likely results both from the IRB's increased feeling of responsibility, and from the IRB's increased feeling of exposure. It is probably no coincidence that the dramatic, path-breaking protocols that are likely to receive press coverage are subjected to especially stringent IRB oversight to begin with: they are probably more risky. However, higher IRB surveillance of the research in question may also be in reaction to the likelihood that the IRB itself may come under scrunity and be held to a higher standard of responsibility. For example, a committee at the University of Utah established to select a patient for the implantation of the artificial heart included as a nonvoting participant a member of the IRB whose job it was to "ensure that all the review procedures outlined in the protocol (were) followed."20 Similarly, in the case of the xenotransplantation of Baby Fae at Loma Linda Medical Center, an IRB member monitored the informed consent process as a participant.21 In both of these cases, the IRBs came under considerable media scrutiny as a byproduct of the coverage of the novel procedure in question.22
The argument against monitoring by IRBs is based in part on the belief that such activity would compromise trust. Proponents of this argument, however, may unjustifiably assume that investigators with good faith will implement IRB recommendations entirely. Problems may arise even aside from the admittedly rare case of an unscrupulous investigator. Some investigators may fail to implement IRB requirements not through bad faith, but rather through administrative negligence. Simple examples of this involve using outdated consent forms instead of IRB approved revised versions,23 or obtaining biased or inappropriate witnessing for consent documents.24 Errors of this kind make a sham of the whole deliberative IRB review intended to assure a good informed consent process and an appropriate informed consent form. Truly some type of follow-up would be necessary to avoid such errors.
Moreover, if IRB credibility rests on a presumption of trust, then why, in some cases, do IRBs nevertheless institute their own oversight process? It must be because they feel, in the types of situations outlined above, that their responsibility extends beyond reviewing paperwork. IRBs do not, and arguably cannot, perform this monitoring function all the time. It is therefore presumably the rarity of such activityand the attendant small IRB time input-that prevents the undermining of investigator trust. But this is a dubious supposition; indeed, investigators may feel relatively more mistrusted if they are subject to ad hoc spot checks than if they were uniformly scrutinized under some specified guidelines.
We should be aware that we are letting issues of practicality (e.g., monetary and time constaints) and credibility (e.g., loss of investigator trust) get in the way of a uniform application of our obligation and of our mandate. This trade-off may be necessary, but it is only necessary if we believe that any kind of monitoring would result in the loss of investigator good will, would thus undermine the whole IRB process, and hence ultimately adversely affect subjects even more. Thus, a compromise has evolved between ensuring true informed consent and appropriate risk in all protocols on the one hand and preserving investigator trust on the other hand. It is important to acknowledge this compromise openly.
Where Increased Vigilance
May be Needed
There may be more appropriate circumstances than those outlined above to subject research to IRB monitoring. That is, given that it is impossible to monitor all research, but also given that some informal monitoring is indeed going on, more appropriate, formal guidelines could be established that would better protect the subjects of research. While increased vigilance in cases of outsider scrutiny may well be cynical and self-serving, increased vigilance in cases of greater risk does seem sensible and serves to protect subjects adequately. There is ample precedent for increased attention to ethical precepts such as subject autonomy and justice when more is at stake, when the research is riskier.25
But beyond research where subjects are at special risk, we should monitor research where consent itself is at special risk. There are two types of situations where this obtains and where IRB monitoring is therefore appropriate. One type of situation arises when the study population itself is vulnerable. Such populations include the incarcerated, the mentally infirm, the young, and so forth. These groups are often relatively less able to give informed consent.
Alternatively, certain kinds of researchers are especially prone to take risks and neglect appropriate consent procedures. Such "permissive" researchers, admittedly a minority, have been described by Bernard Barber of Columbia University as falling within one of the following groups: (1) the "relatively unsuccessful scientist striving for recognition;" (2) the "extreme mass producer" researcher; (3) the "underrecognized," presumably disaffected, faculty member; and (4) the investigator in an especially competitive field.26 In sum, ambitious, isolated investigators are more prone to neglect subject rights. In addition, researchers previously identified as practicing inadequate informed consent would also constitute a suspect group.27
Stricter IRB oversight and monitoring is therefore necessary in studies where: (1) the research is especially risky; (2) the research population is vulnerable to poor consent; and (3) the researcher is prone to obtain poor consent. A mechanism for identifying which protocols fall within these categories should be established within each institution. IRBs should expend some systematic effort in monitoring such protocols and thus properly protect human subjects of research. 
